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Judicial Reform in Texas:
A Look Back After Two Decades
Anthony Champagne

O

ne of the most frequently quoted comments on judicial
reform is the late New Jersey Chief Justice Arthur T.
Vanderbilt’s remark, “Judicial reform is not for the
short-winded.”1 Vanderbilt’s remark illustrates a key point
about judicial selection reform. Reforms do not occur simply
because someone or some group in a state decides that change
in the system of selection is desirable; rather, it is necessary for
key interest groups in the judicial politics of a state to reach a
sufficient political consensus that change can occur. A variety
of factors may lead to such a consensus on the need for reform.
In Oklahoma, for example, judicial reform came about as a
result of a major scandal in the state’s judiciary.2 But in some
states, consensus for change among key stakeholders is difficult.3 Key interest groups can have competing objectives, making judicial reform impossible. At other times, political conditions—the political environment of a state—lessen the chances
of reform.
This article will focus on Texas’s judicial reform experiences
for the past two decades. Texas has been a bellwether state in
heralding a new era in judicial elections. It was the first state
where widespread problems developed in judicial elections in
the 1980s. There was judicial scandal, supreme court elections
become a battleground for plaintiffs and business interests,
there were huge sums spent in Supreme Court races, there was
intense competition between the political parties for control of
the state judiciary, and there were increasing demands from
minorities for greater representation on the bench.4
In trial court elections, beginning in the early 1980s, first in
Dallas County and later spreading to other counties, most
notably Harris County where Houston is located, there was a
pattern of partisan sweeps in judicial elections where large
numbers of judges were defeated for reelection simply because
they had a different party affiliation from the popular candidate
at the top of the ticket. In Dallas County, Republicans swept the
trial court elections to such a degree that many of the remaining Democratic judges changed their party affiliation to the
Republican Party in a bid for political survival.5
At first Texas seemed an anomaly with its expensive, highly

partisan judicial elections. It did not take long, however, for
other states to follow. The Texas judicial experience was actually a harbinger of things to come in other state judicial elections.
With the rise of this new level of competition in judicial
elections, there was a major push to change the system of
selection in Texas. However, just as in many other states where
judicial elections have become highly competitive, the system
of selection has not changed.6 On the surface, Texas seemed to
have all the components that one might think necessary for
change: Intensely partisan and expensive judicial elections; a
major judicial scandal; widespread negative publicity about the
state’s judiciary; and an active reform movement led by a wellknown major figure. Still, the system did not change.
As in Texas, in states where judicial elections have become
expensive and competitive, judicial reform efforts have developed. As a general matter, reform efforts in recent years have
proven ineffective in changing the system of judicial selection.
The Texas experience offers a lesson in the difficulties of judicial selection changes. What happened in Texas suggests the
importance and the enormous difficulty in developing a political coalition among key interests in a state that can bring about
change in the system of judicial selection. This article will
explore what went wrong with the judicial reform movement
in Texas. In the process, it will offer a blueprint of what can go
wrong with a reform effort and explain why in Texas, and
many other states, judicial reform efforts have failed. However,
this article will also suggest that opportunities are now developing in Texas for a new reform effort—opportunities caused
primarily by changing state demographics, which are quickly
altering the state’s political climate.
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I.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN
TEXAS

In Texas, like other states, judicial elections were once lowkey, inexpensive, sleepy affairs. Judges were only rarely
defeated and generally did not have opposition.7 One description of this old era in judicial politics noted:

At election time, sitting justices almost never drew
opposition. Some justices resigned before the end of
their terms, enabling their replacements to be named by
the governor and to run as incumbents. In the event
that an open seat was actually contested, the decisive
factor in the race was the State Bar poll, which was the
key to newspaper endorsements and the support of
courthouse politicians.8
Things began to change in Texas judicial politics in the late
1970s. First, in 1976 an unknown lawyer ran for the Texas
Supreme Court against a highly respected incumbent who had
won the State Bar poll by a 90% margin. That unknown lawyer
won even though a State Bar grievance committee had filed a
disbarment suit against him alleging 53 violations—another 20
more allegations were later added. However, the lawyer had a
famous Texas name, Yarbrough, which probably led voters to
confuse him with another Yarbrough who had twice run a
strong race for governor or with the long-time U.S. senator
from Texas, Ralph Yarborough. Although Justice Yarbrough
served only a few months before criminal charges and the
threat of legislative removal led to his resignation,9 the case
provided a lesson: Name identification could elect nearly anyone to the bench in Texas. In 1978, a little known plaintiffs’
lawyer named Robert Campbell successfully ran against an
incumbent judge for the Texas Supreme Court. There was
speculation that Campbell benefited from University of Texas
running back Earl Campbell winning the Heisman Trophy the
previous fall.10
A recognizable name could put someone on the bench in
Texas. However, it was also possible to use advertising to create name identification.11 That, of course, meant there was a
need for campaign funds. Texas became a battleground
between members of the civil bar, plaintiffs’ attorneys and
defense lawyers who realized that campaign funds could buy
the name recognition for the judicial candidates who reflected
their points of view.12 And, once these opposing segments of
the bar got into the battle for control of the Texas bench, they
discovered they could not simply depart the battleground; else
the opposing side would be victorious in the election.13 Like
warfare, once the fighting between the opposing sides of the
bar started, it was nearly impossible for either to stop.
Another thing that was making it impossible to go back to
the old style of judicial campaigns was that Texas was developing a viable two-party system. In 1978, Texas elected its first
Republican governor since Reconstruction. With the election

8. Paul Burka, Heads, We Win, Tails, You Lose, TEXAS MONTHLY, May
1987, at 138-139.
9. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7 at 911.
10. Id. at n.25.
11. Id. at 911.
12. CHEEK & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 4, at 37-51.
13. Big money remained in Texas Supreme Court elections even after
state elections moved into the Republican column. Id. at 50.
14. James Brian McCall, In the Shadow of John Connally: An
Examination of Gubernatorial Power in Texas 66-68 (2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Dallas)
(on file with author).

of a Republican governor,
Big-money judicial
appointments to vacant seats
on major trial courts and the campaigns quickly
appellate courts were in his
led to problems in
hands, and, with relatively
Texas.
few exceptions, he insisted
that his judicial appointees
agree to run in subsequent elections as Republicans.14 It was
also the case that the election of a Republican governor heralded the emergence of a viable Republican Party in the state.
The state quickly moved from a one-party Democratic state to
a competitive two-party state before becoming largely a oneparty Republican state.15 That meant candidates for judicial
offices had opposition, not just in their base, which had been
the Democratic Party primary where opposition was often
minimal and more easily controlled, but in the general election. Candidates for judicial office had to have money, often
for media buys for television, which was not only an expensive
form of campaigning, but a necessary one in a large, urban, and
competitive state.
Where does really big money in judicial campaigns originate? It tends to come from economic interests that have a
stake in judicial decisions.16 As a result, candidates for judicial
office tended to increasingly reflect one or the other of the
opposing economic interests funding them.
Big-money judicial campaigns quickly led to problems in
Texas. One was the claim that judges were biased in favor of
their campaign contributors.17 As a result, there was criticism
about the new and very substantial role of money in judicial
campaigns.18 Another problem with big money in judicial campaigns was the risk of scandal caused by an unhealthy relationship between judges and their contributors.19 One highly publicized example of that unhealthy relationship can be found in
the case of Manges v. Guerra:20 In Manges, a jury found Clinton
Manges, acting as the manager of mineral leases on 70,000
acres of the Guerra family’s land, violated his obligations to the
Guerras. Manges was removed from his manager’s position and
the Guerras were awarded $382,000 in actual damages and
$500,000 in exemplary damages.21 Ultimately the case was
taken to the Texas Supreme Court by Manges, who hired a wellknown San Antonio plaintiff’s lawyer to represent him.22 The
case was assigned to a justice who had received substantial
campaign contributions from both Manges and his lawyer.
Initially the justice proposed an opinion that supported
Manges, but that opinion was rejected and so the justice tried
again. Two justices eventually recused themselves—one

15. Id.; see also Champagne, supra note 5, at 67-80.
16. Champagne, supra note 5, at 84-90.
17. See, e.g., Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan.
11, 1988, at 74; Mary Flood, Justice Still for Sale? Clock Is Ticking
on the Answer, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1998, at T1.
18. See, e.g., Pete Slover, Group Alleges Supreme Court Favors Donors,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 25, 2001, at 23A.
19. CHEEK & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 4, at 172-176.
20. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
21. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7, at 912.
22. Id.
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because he had been sued by
Manges over a campaign
statement he had made, and
the other because he had
received $100,000 in campaign money from Manges
and his lawyer.
With those recusals, the vote was 4-3 for Manges and for
reversal of the lower court. The chief justice ruled that five
votes were required for reversal. At that point, the justice who
had recused himself due to the campaign contribution decided
to vote in favor of reversal.23 The attorney for the Guerras filed
a motion for rehearing and asked that three justices, including
the justice who had changed his vote from recusal to reversal,
recuse themselves due to receiving significant campaign
money from Manges and his attorney.24 The justices did not
recuse themselves.
The following year, a justice (one of the three whose recusal
had been requested) told a different litigant (a litigant who also
was a potential campaign contributor) that his case was a
tough one and that if he did not win it, he would win the
next.25 The justice then discussed the court’s deliberations and
told the litigant that he would see what could be done back in
Austin.26 In 1985, at the request of the attorney in the Manges
case, the justice attempted to transfer two cases from one court
of appeals to another.27 These matters, plus other misbehavior
by the justice, led to his public reprimand by the State
Commission on Judicial Conduct.28 Another justice (also one
of the three whose recusal had been requested) was swept into
the scandal because two of his briefing attorneys had accepted
a weekend trip to Las Vegas from a member of the same plaintiffs’ firm that had represented Clinton Manges.29 He had also
solicited funds to prosecute a suit against a former briefing
attorney who had testified before a House Committee in a
manner unfavorable to the justice.30 For these actions, the justice received a public admonishment by the State Commission
on Judicial Conduct.31
At roughly the same time, the Texas Supreme Court refused
to review an $11 billion judgment against Texaco.32 From
1984 until early 1987, more than $355,000 was contributed to
the then-justices on the Texas Supreme Court by lawyers representing Pennzoil and, although lawyers for Texaco also contributed, they gave far less.33
Not only was there scandal, but it was highly publicized

scandal. On December 6, 1987, the national television program 60 Minutes featured a story about the Texas Supreme
Court that was titled, “Is Justice for Sale?”34 The program
explored the relationship between large campaign contributions and judicial decisions in Texas. It was a devastating portrayal of what can go wrong in the new politics of judicial
selection.
Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice John Hill proposed merit
selection of judges as an alternative to the current system of
partisan election of judges.35 He proposed himself as the
leader of a movement for judicial reform.36 Hill was a highly
visible figure in Texas politics, far more than most state
supreme court justices. He had been a successful lawyer in
Texas, a former Texas Attorney General (a statewide elective
office), and the Democratic candidate for governor of Texas in
1978. To get that nomination for governor, he had defeated the
incumbent governor in the Democratic primary.37
Thus, there seemed all the components of a successful
reform movement: There was a new politics of judicial elections in Texas where there were competitive, expensive races;
these races involved major battles between competing economic interests, most clearly the business community and the
plaintiffs’ bar; there was highly publicized scandal with strong
overtones of systemic corruption in a system that depended on
money from lawyers and litigants who appeared before the
courts; and there was a visible leader of a movement pushing
for reform of the system by offering a well-established solution
to the problem—merit selection of judges. Success seemed
just around the corner.

23. Id.
24. Motion for Recusal of Justice C.L. Ray, Manges v. Guerra, 673
S.W.2d 180 (Tex.1983) (No. C-771); Motion for Recusal of
Justices Ted Z. Robertson and William W. Kilgarlin, Manges v.
Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1983) (No. C-771).
25. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7, at 912.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 913.
28. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Findings, Conclusions and
Public Reprimand Relating to Certain Activities of Justice C.L. Ray of
the Supreme Court of Texas (1987).
29. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7, at n.34.
30. Id.

31. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Findings, Conclusions and
Public Admonishment Relating to Certain Activities of Justice
William Kilgarlin of the Supreme Court of Texas (1987).
32. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7, at 913.
33. Id. at n.35.
34. 60 Minutes: Is Justice for Sale? (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 6,
1987).
35. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7, at 913.
36. Id.
37. For a discussion of Chief Justice Hill and his earlier effort to
become governor of Texas, see McCall, supra note 14, at 53, 5860.
38. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7, at 913.

[T]here seemed all
the components of
a successful reform
movement.
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II. TEXAS JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM IN THE 1980S:
POLITICS, INFLUENCE, AND THE PUBLIC’S
PREDILECTIONS

Texas’s judicial reform movement was to die a slow death
for a variety of reasons, mostly reflecting political conditions in
the state and an inability to develop enough of a coalition of
competing interests to change the system. Yet, the demise of
the reform movement is instructive, not only for future reform
efforts in Texas, but also for reform movements in other states.
The first notable problem with judicial reform in Texas was
the problem of Chief Justice John Hill taking the leadership
role in the movement. There was immense opposition to his
reform efforts from within the court and unprecedented intracourt conflict emerged.38 Fifteen months after Hill proposed

merit selection and only
half-way through his sixyear term as chief justice,
Hill resigned.39 His replacement in 1988 was Tom
Phillips, a Republican and a
Houston trial-court judge.
Phillips was also a supporter
of judicial selection reform.40 Judicial selection reform seemed
to be in the air when Chief Justice Hill used the ceremony on
January 4, 1988 that installed Phillips as his successor as a
forum to argue for merit selection. The fires of opposition
roared quickly in response: Justice Robert Campbell resigned
January 6, 1988, explaining that, among other activities, he
was going to actively campaign against merit selection.41
The turmoil on the Texas Supreme Court surrounding Hill’s
efforts turned out to be a small molehill compared to the major
political opposition developing to prevent merit selection in
Texas. Texas was evolving into a true two-party state after a
century plus of almost complete Democratic Party dominance.
The two parties found themselves in rare agreement on one
issue: They were adamant in their support for partisan election
of judges.42
It was not only the political parties, however, that were
involved in the fight over judicial selection. Two key segments
of the bar—the plaintiffs’ bar and the defense bar—used the
partisan election system to forward their objectives of controlling the bench. By 1980, the election of Texas Supreme Court
justices (which has only civil jurisdiction; the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals is the highest court in the state for criminal
matters) had become a battleground for plaintiffs’ attorneys
and defense lawyers, each trying to elect judicial candidates
favorable to their perspective.43
Supreme court races were getting increasingly expensive.44
Initially, competition between plaintiff-bar-backed and
defense-bar-backed judicial candidates occurred in the
Democratic primary because the Republican Party was so weak
in the state. However, in 1988, several strong Republican candidates for the Texas Supreme Court moved campaign contributions to record levels.45 Increasingly, the tendency was for
defense interests to back Republican candidates and plaintiffs’
lawyers to back Democratic candidates.46 In 1994 there was an
effort by a plaintiff-backed candidate to defeat a pro-defense
Democratic justice in the Democratic primary. Total expenditures in that primary came to $4,490,000 which made it one of
the most expensive judicial races in history.47 When the prodefense Democratic justice won what was one of the most
vicious judicial campaigns in Texas history, the Republican

candidate for the justice’s seat withdrew, giving the pro-defense
Democrat an easy electoral victory. It seemed clear the
Republican was only in the race to compete against the
Democratic nominee if the plaintiff-backed candidate won the
primary.48 Plaintiffs and business interests were fighting it out
in partisan judicial elections and, at least at that time, were
reluctant to change the battleground, though the plaintiffs’ bar
seemed to have more at stake in maintaining partisan elections
than did business interests.
When Chief Justice John Hill was proposing merit selection
in Texas in the late 1980s, the plaintiffs’ bar was a powerful
force in Texas Democratic politics. They were opposed to a
change in the method of judicial selection.49 Their campaign
contributions had placed several pro-plaintiff justices on the
Texas Supreme Court in the 1980s, and the result was that several key judicial decisions had been favorable to plaintiffs.50
While the Republican Party was growing in the state,
Democrats were still winning major judicial offices, and many
of those Democrats had the backing of the plaintiffs’ bar. The
plaintiffs’ bar could use its campaign contributions to back
candidates sympathetic to plaintiffs. Although not all
Democrats in Texas were pro-plaintiff, the plaintiffs’ bar
backed Democrats who were far more likely to be sympathetic
to the plaintiffs’ views than were Republicans.51 With Texas
electing in 1978 its first Republican governor since
Reconstruction (Dallas oilman Bill Clements was the
Republican who defeated John Hill for the governorship, by
18,000 votes), it seemed much more desirable for plaintiffs’
lawyers to use the partisan election system to elect the type of
judges they wanted than to use a merit selection system where
the governor who would be appointing judges might well be a
Republican or, given the history of Texas politics, a conservative Democrat.52
Additionally, the demographics of Texas were changing.
Texas’s Latino population was growing at a dramatic pace, and
Texas’s African-American population was increasingly concentrated in the state’s urban centers, most notably Dallas and
Houston. With Latino population growth and AfricanAmerican population concentration came political power in
Texas politics.53 These two groups had an important voice in
whether there would be change in the way Texas selected its
judges. The problem for the judicial reformers was that neither Latino nor African-American interest groups wanted merit
selection. Instead, they were interested in increasing the numbers of Latinos and African-Americans on the bench. As a
method of achieving that objective, Latino and AfricanAmerican interest groups wanted to continue to elect judges,
but they wanted the districts to be smaller than currently

39. Id. at 913-914.
40. CHEEK & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 4, at 173.
41. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7, at 914.
42. Franklin S. Spears, Selection of Appellate Judges, 40 BAYLOR L. REV.
502, 520 (1988).
43. CHEEK & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 4, at 37-54.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.

47. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 7, at 915.
48. Id. at 916.
49. Anthony Champagne, Judicial Selection in Texas: Democracy’s
Deadlock, in TEXAS POLITICS: A READER 96 (2d ed., Anthony
Champagne & Edward J. Harpham eds., 1998).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also McCall, supra note 14.
53. CHEEK & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 4, at 146-159.

[M]ajor political
opposition [was]
developing to
prevent merit
selection in Texas.
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existed. Given the numbers of trial judges in urban counties
and given that all trial judges were elected countywide, the
goal of these groups became the election of trial judges from
districts considerably smaller than the county.54 The problem
for these interests was that to elect African-American judges, a
different subdistrict had to be drawn compared to the subdistricts that had to be drawn to elect Latino judges.
Nevertheless, although African-American interests and Latino
interests would compete over which subdistrict boundaries
were appropriate, neither group offered the politically necessary support for merit selection.
The other problem that Chief Justice Hill and the reform
movement faced was the opposition of numerous incumbent
judges. The incumbent judges had been elected by a partisan
election system, and they were generally happy with that system—especially if their political party was dominant within
their jurisdiction. A lot of opposition to reform came from
judges who were secure in their positions, saw no need to
change, and saw a change in the system of selection as a threat
to their survival on the bench.55
Finally, another problem with the movement for merit
selection in Texas was that voters like to vote for judges. True,
the voters might not know the judicial candidates for whom
they were voting, but they did not like the idea of giving up
their decision-making powers to any blue-ribbon commission
that presented names from which a governor must make a
selection.56 Indeed, then-Justice Franklin Spears, a vocal opponent of merit selection of judges, noted that a non-binding referendum issue appeared on the March 1988 Democratic primary ballot asking whether, “Texans shall maintain their right
to select judges by a direct vote of the people rather than
change to an appointment process created by the legislature.”
Eighty-six percent of those voting on the issue cast their ballot
in favor of elective judges.57 A 1987 statewide poll found that
65% of those polled thought the elective judge system was
“working all right as it is.”58 Still another poll found that 60%
of those polled favored the elective system over an appointive
system.59 Spears also cited a 1986 state bar poll where more
lawyers disfavored a merit selection system than favored it for
major trial courts: 50% to 43%. Additionally, more lawyers disfavored a merit selection system than favored it for appellate
courts: 49% to 45%.60 One can certainly quarrel with some of
the language in the referendum and polling questions, but
Spears seemed to have a point. Texans probably did favor voting for judges. Indeed, there is a long-standing practice in
Texas for voting for a great number of officials. At the
statewide level, for example, not only are nine Texas Supreme
Court justices elected, but the nine Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals judges are as well. Additionally, the three members of

the Railroad Commission
[T]he judicial reform
of Texas are elected
effort simply could
statewide, as is the governor, the lt. governor, the not gain traction . . . .
comptroller, the commissioner of the General
Land Office, and the commissioner of agriculture.61

In spite of former Chief Justice Hill’s best efforts, the judicial reform effort simply could not gain traction in the face of
opposition from the political parties, the trial lawyers, AfricanAmerican and Latino interest groups, incumbent judges, and a
state political culture that favored election of large numbers of
officials, including state judges. However, the politics of the
state were changing dramatically, money was heavily involved
in judicial elections, and the Clinton Department of Justice
was suggesting that they would refuse to approve the creation
of any more courts in Texas on the grounds that the current
system discriminated against minorities. In 1994, judicial
reform gained new life because the state’s lt. governor, Bob
Bullock, a Democrat and one of the most powerful and effective politicians in the state’s history, created a committee to
explore the possibilities of developing a judicial reform proposal.62
The committee was designed to give key interests a voice in
developing the proposal. Three Democratic state senators and
three Republican state senators were appointed. One of the
Democratic state senators was an African-American with close
ties to civil-rights groups in Houston that advocated greater
representation of African-Americans on the bench. One of the
Democratic state senators was a Latino who had close ties to
civil-rights groups in San Antonio that advocated greater representation of Latinos on the bench. Four other members of
the committee were judges—one Republican and three
Democrats. Three of the judges were Texas Supreme Court
justices, and one was the presiding judge of the Court of
Criminal Appeals. The Republican justice was Chief Justice
Tom Phillips, the chief justice who replaced John Hill on the
bench and who was himself a strong advocate of a retention
system for selecting judges rather than the partisan election
system. The president of the Texas Trial Lawyers Association,
the major plaintiffs’ attorney organization in the state, regularly attended the meetings. Another participant was a public
relations specialist who was a close friend of Lt. Governor
Bullock and who represented business interests in political and
legislative matters. No public or consumer representatives
were on the committee, no lower-court judges, and no mem-

54. Champagne, supra note 49, at 97-98.
55. Id. at 98.
56. The loss of the right to vote for judges is, of course, a concern of
voters nationwide. Former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice
Tom Phillips, writing about judicial elections, noted that a poll
published in 2002 “shows clearly that voters cherish their franchise and in elected states they generally prefer to retain it by a
two to one margin.” Thomas R. Phillips, Electoral Accountability

and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 140 (2003).
57. Spears, supra note 42, at 519.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 520.
60. Id.
61. Statewide Elected Officials, Texas Secretary of State,
http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/elected.shtml.
62. Champagne, supra note 49, at 99-100.

III. TEXAS JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM ACTIVITIES IN
THE 1990S
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bers of the Texas House of Representatives. Notably, John Hill
was not invited to attend the meetings. Bullock claimed that
Hill had wanted to be on the committee, but because Hill had
become such a political lightning rod, it was impossible for
him to be asked to serve. At least one state senator, the chief
justice, and the business representative were strong supporters
of merit selection.63
It quickly became clear that there were no easy solutions to
judicial selection issues in the state that could accommodate
all the competing interests. Some sort of compromise had to
be developed. Minorities were willing to support modifications of the appellate courts in exchange for greater representation of minorities on trial courts. While minorities believed
it would be possible to draw smaller districts within counties
that would increase minority representation on the bench, they
knew that appellate court districts were so vast that small districts for appellate courts would still be so large that minorities
would not benefit. Business interests saw an opportunity.
They were willing to support greater minority representation
on the trial court bench in exchange for an appointive system
such as merit selection for the appellate courts. Plaintiffs’
lawyers saw their influence on appellate courts weakening. It
would not make much difference to their interests whether
Republican governors appointed pro-business judges to the
appellate bench or whether voters elected them. Smaller trial
courts, however, opened up the possibility that at least some
pro-plaintiff trial judges could continue to be elected.64
Creating a compromise was difficult, however, because
minorities and plaintiffs’ lawyers had long fought merit selection; they were fearful that such a system would not benefit
their interests. Republicans and judges, on the other hand,
were uncomfortable with the idea of small districts.
Eventually, however, the committee agreed on a compromise
where appellate judges would be appointed by the governor;
trial judges in urban areas would be elected from county commissioners’ precincts. After serving for a time, they would run
countywide in retention elections. Later, they would have to
be reelected from county commissioners’ precincts. In order to
depoliticize the judiciary, judges were to be elected in nonpartisan elections, which would protect judges from the party
sweeps that had occurred in recent elections in urban counties
where large numbers of trial court judges were swept out of
office simply because their party affiliation was an unpopular
one during a particular election.65
Although it was a complicated scheme, the compromise, on
its face, seemed to have something for everyone. Business got
an appointive appellate judiciary. Minorities and plaintiffs’
lawyers got smaller trial court districts, which would allow for
the election of more minorities and some plaintiff-oriented
judges. Judges were protected from party sweeps.66
The problem, of course, was in the details of the compromise. Although African-Americans were very supportive of the

compromise, Latinos were not.
The problem, of
At that time, Harris (where
course, was in
Houston is located) and Dallas
counties were the two largest
the details . . . .
counties in Texas and elected a
total of 96 of the 386 district court judges in Texas. These
counties were so large, and so many judges were elected in
each metropolitan area, they were the most important in any
plan that would increase minority representation on the bench.
Since every county in Texas is divided into four county commissioners’ precincts, under the compromise, one-fourth of
Harris and Dallas County trial judges would be elected from
each precinct. However, Harris and Dallas County both had
three white county commissioners and one African-American
county commissioner. Latinos did not believe such a compromise would promote the election of more Latino judges;
instead, they thought districts much smaller than a county
commissioner’s precinct were needed to elect Latino judges.67
The political parties also opposed the compromise.
Nonpartisan elections would protect the interests of incumbent judges from party sweeps, but nonpartisan elections
weakened the political parties. Additionally, an appointive system reduced the number of elective judges and therefore
reduced the importance of the political parties. ThenGovernor George W. Bush would have benefited from the compromise because of his power to appoint appellate judges;
however, he opposed the compromise as well, probably
because he did not want to oppose the Republican Party.68
Lt. Governor Bullock backed his committee’s recommendations, and the compromise was turned into legislation that
passed the Texas Senate, probably because Bullock had such
sway over the state senate that any legislation that he endorsed
had a high probability of success in that body. However, things
did not go so well in the Texas House. Democratic Speaker
Pete Laney did not give priority to judicial selection reform.
Additionally, the opposition of the parties and of Governor
Bush emboldened critics of the compromise. Moreover, Latino
house members tried to amend the compromise. Instead of
electing district judges by county commissioners’ precincts in
urban areas, they proposed that the judges be elected from
state representative districts. Of course, that proposal
increased the chance that Latino judges would be elected in
urban counties, but it also reduced the number of AfricanAmerican judges who were likely to be elected. The modified
proposal also proved unacceptable to business interests and to
Republicans who could not approve of even smaller constituencies for judges than commissioners’ precincts. In the
face of the various opposition constituencies, the compromise
plan failed.69
Although the compromise effort led by Lt. Governor
Bullock failed, it was not a total failure. Significantly, Bullock’s
judicial reform bill did pass the state senate. It was the first

63. Id. at 100.
64. Id. at 100-102.
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

Court Review 75

time a judicial selection
reform proposal survived
that far in the legislative
process. Of course, in Texas
a judicial selection reform
proposal would still have a
long way to go, since it is likely that most changes in the judicial selection system would not only have to pass the legislature, but would have to be submitted to the voters in the form
of a constitutional amendment.
Buoyed by the passage of the proposed bill in the Senate, in
1996-97 the Texas Supreme Court created task forces to
develop proposals for improving the Texas judiciary. One of
the task forces was assigned to examine the issue of judicial
selection, but, even though the task force expressed concerns
over the current system for selecting judges, the members were
unable to agree upon an alternative judicial selection system.70
Chief Justice Phillips tried to push the issue of judicial selection reform in his State of the Judiciary address where he criticized the partisanship of judicial elections, the role of money
in judicial races, and the lack of minority representation on the
bench.71
Prospects for reform, however, seemed slim as the 1997 legislative session began to draw to a conclusion. In the senate,
there was a proposal that provided for appointment of appellate judges and the election of district judges in nonpartisan
elections. Both appellate and trial judges would then run in
retention elections, although trial judges would run in regular
nonpartisan elections after two retention elections. In counties
larger than one million, district judges would be elected from
county commissioners’ precincts. Another senate proposal
provided for the appointment, election, and retention of appellate judges and eliminated straight party voting for appellate
and district judges. Appellate judges would have to run in partisan elections following the expiration of their appointed
terms and then would be subject to retention elections.72
Of these two proposals, the first bill was sponsored by an
African-American Democrat from Houston. He did not have
enough support from non-minority legislators to pass the bill.
The second bill was proposed by a white Republican from West
Texas. Minorities threatened to oppose that plan on the
grounds that it did not increase the likelihood of minority representation on the bench.
After considerable posturing by the sponsors of the two
bills, a compromise bill was designed where appellate judges
would be appointed. District judges would also be appointed,
but the districts would be county commissioners’ precincts.
The appointed judges would then run against opponents in the
next primary elections, but all candidates would run in all primaries, which created a nonpartisan primary election. If a candidate did not receive 50% of the vote, there would be a runoff in the general election. The winner would serve for four
years and would then run in a nonpartisan retention election.

In the 2003 legislative session, another major effort was
made to change the system of judicial selection in Texas. The
West Texas Republican senator who had pushed so hard for
judicial selection reform in the 1996-97 session tried again
with a bill that would have appellate and district judges
appointed by the governor with the consent of the Texas
Senate. After appointment, the judges would run for office in
retention elections. One of the strongest supporters of the bill
was Chief Justice Tom Phillips, a long-standing advocate of
judicial selection reform. And, just as had occurred when Lt.
Governor Bob Bullock took an interest in judicial selection
reform, the bill cleared the senate, only to die in the house.74
The bill did have bipartisan support, however, including
significant Republican support. A Republican group, “Make
Texas Proud,” was formed to support the bill, and membership
in the organization included former Republican Governor Bill
Clements, former Republican National Co-chairwoman Anne
Armstrong, and three former state party chairs. Possibly this
strengthened Republican support had something to do with
Chief Justice Phillips’s efforts to show that demographic
changes in urban counties would shortly bring a Democratic
resurgence to those areas. In contrast, this forecasted demographic change may have been what prompted important
Democrats to oppose judicial selection reform. The Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund also opposed the
reform. Most important, many Republican leaders, including
the leadership of the state Republican Party, were opposed to
changing the system of judicial selection in the state. Politics,
of course, often relates to the here and now, not to future
demographic changes. The Texas Republican Party mounted a
mighty effort against the bill.75
In its effort to kill the judicial selection reform bill, the
Texas Republican Party attacked one of their own, Chief
Justice Tom Phillips, the first Republican chief justice of the
Texas Supreme Court since Reconstruction and the first
Republican Texas Supreme Court justice to win election to the
state supreme court since Reconstruction. Texas Republican
Party Chairwoman Susan Weddington claimed the bill was
Chief Justice Phillips’s idea and that he was the one “very out
front on this.” 76 The Texas Republican Party’s website contained a petition that visitors could sign “to protect Texans’
right to elect their judges!”77 The state Republican Party sent
out an e-mail to party members urging them to contact law-
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[T]he compromise
effort . . . was not
a total failure . . . .
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Much like Lt. Governor Bullock’s committee’s compromise,
however, this proposal did not resolve the concerns of Latinos,
who continued to believe that smaller judicial districts were
needed to elect Latino judges. Incumbent trial judges were
also concerned about the plan since it would affect their districts and also dramatically change the process by which
judges were elected. 73
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makers to oppose the bill.78 Supporters in the house were lobbying colleagues, and Chief Justice Phillips, along with
Associate Justices Craig Enoch and Harriet O”Neill, were seeking the support of house members. The bill was about to be
voted out of the House Judicial Affairs Committee with majority support when staff members for the new Republican
Speaker told the chairman of the committee to pull the bill
from consideration. Although the Democratic Party also
opposed the bill, it was the opposition of the state Republican
Party that had the real impact.79
Not long thereafter, Chief Justice Tom Phillips retired from
the bench, to be replaced by a chief justice, Wallace Jefferson,
who is much less supportive of judicial selection reform than
his predecessor.80 Perhaps the most effective and respected
advocate of selection reform in the state was no longer in a
strong position to advocate change—and his harshest critics
had been the leaders of the political party in which Chief
Justice Phillips had been a pioneer. Judicial selection reform
had again been defeated, this time with seemingly a fatal blow
by the Texas Republican Party.
What a difference one election can make! In the November,
2006 elections, 42 Democrats opposed 42 Republicans in
Dallas County judicial elections—the county that was at one
time the core of the Republican Party in the state.81 All 42
Democrats won, leaving only 17 Republican judges in Dallas
County who either were unopposed or were not up for election
in the cycle.82 Immediately, speculation began as to whether
the 17 Republicans would change their party affiliation in
order to keep their positions, something a number of
Democratic judges did in the early 1980s when the county
moved from the Democratic to the Republican column.83
There had been hints of a voting shift in Dallas County since
at least 2002 when a Democrat won a position as a county trial
judge. Then in 2004, three Democratic judicial candidates
won elections as did a Democratic candidate for county sheriff. But 2006 was a Democratic sweep with all 42 Democratic
judicial candidates elected, a Democratic district attorney
elected, and a Democratic county judge (the equivalent of a
county executive).84 Some of the Democratic candidates won
simply by riding the wave of Democratic voting and raised lit-

tle money, had no campaign
What a difference
Web site, did not appear at
one election can
campaign events, and did not
respond to candidate quesmake!
tionnaires.85 Interestingly,
some of the Democratic
judges who were elected had been defeated years ago in the
Republican electoral sweeps of the 1980s when Republican
judges rapidly gained control of the courthouse.86
The movement to the Democrats was part of a demographic
shift in Dallas County that had long been predicted by some.87
As the minority population in Dallas County increased, so did
the percentage of voters who selected Democratic candidates
until finally there was a shift in the power of the political parties. Demographic trends suggest that Harris County, where
Houston is located, should not, according to these demographic projections, be very far behind.88 Harris County is the
most populous county in the state with the largest number of
judges. Further into the future, the growth of the Latino population in the state can be expected to eventually shift
statewide elections into the Democratic column.89
Even though the greatest opposition to judicial reform in
Texas has been the Texas Republican Party and a center of
opposition has been Dallas County Republicans—most
notably Dallas County judges, there is talk in Republican circles that it is time to reconsider their opposition to change in
partisan election of judges.90 As Charles Sartain, the lawyer
who represents the Dallas County Republican Party was
quoted as saying, “[t]he Republicans in Harris and Dallas
thought things were just fine the way they were. Since the
election I am speaking to more Republicans who favor a different method and want to figure out how to sell it to the
Legislature.”91
At least for the time being, both the Texas Republican Party
and the Texas Democratic Party remain opposed to merit
selection. When a Republican state senator and a Republican
state representative announced in the aftermath of the election that they would introduce merit selection legislation in
the legislature, the state Republican Party stated that it was
standing on principle and continued to support partisan elec-
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tion of judges.
The state
Democratic Party announced it
continued to support the voters’ right to choose judges.
On the other hand, the Texas
Association of Defense Counsel
announced that it had historically supported the concept of retention elections for appellate
judges, and the Texas Trial Lawyers Association announced
that it was open to considering the idea.92 No doubt it will
take more time for key interest groups to calculate the costs
and benefits of taking a new position on merit selection—the
strength and breadth of the demographic shift in voting in
Texas needs to be assessed, especially since some argument is
also being made that this shift is largely due to unhappiness
with President Bush.93 Moreover, the voting shift has so far
been limited to one large county in the state.

[T]he judicial
reform movement
has taken on
new life . . . .

V. CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the judicial reform movement has
taken on new life now that a base of the Republican Party has
been swept out of office. John Hill, wrote in the Texas Lawyer
that Texas should have merit selection because, “Partisanship
is a cancer on the judiciary. Lawyers should take all possible
steps to remove it. There is no Republican or Democratic justice.”94
It is looking like judicial elections are becoming competitive
again in Texas. This advent of competitiveness in judicial elections in the state offers an opportunity for reformers and a
challenge. If it is possible to change the system of selection
while the parties are competitive in the state where no party
has an advantage and both parties are at risk, it seems possible
that change in the system of selection can occur as a way of
reducing electoral uncertainty on the bench. However, if the
demographic changes in the state lead to rapid political
changes so that the Democratic Party sees a rapid emergence as
the dominant party in Texas, it will be much harder to change
the system of selection. If the Democrats are dominant in the
state’s judicial elections, they will likely become, as the
Republican Party did before them, the major obstacle to judicial reform. The interests that support the Democratic Party,
most notably plaintiffs’ lawyers, African-Americans, and
Latinos, will have an interest in insuring the continuation of
partisan elected judges when those judges are Democrats.
Nevertheless, as John Hill has stated in reference to judicial
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selection reform, “Maybe this is the time that lightning’s going
to strike.”95 Hill may be right. There are moments when policy proposals are timed to fit with the political needs of a state.
This may be the moment. It is a cusp of a great demographic
change that promises to create increased political competitiveness and immense political turmoil. If this period of great
competitiveness is a consistent and relatively lengthy period
where no key interests see an immediate forthcoming political
advantage, the opportunity exists to build a political coalition
that can bring about a change in judicial selection systems.
The problem with the last great opportunity for change—the
late 1980s—when John Hill first proposed judicial selection
reform was essentially threefold:
(1) the changes in Texas judicial politics were unprecedented so there was no sense of how lasting or dramatic the changes might be;
(2) there was inconsistency in the changes occurring in
the state’s judiciary—Republicans, for example, had
a political advantage with Ronald Reagan at the top
of the ticket in 1980 and 1984, but Democrats had an
advantage with Democratic Senator Lloyd Bentsen at
the top of the ticket in 1982; and
(3) the changes in Texas judicial politics were quite
rapid. The first Republican to win a Texas Supreme
Court seat won in 1988 and by 1994, Democrats
could no longer win a contested Texas Supreme
Court race.
Thus, with the previous great opportunity to change Texas
judicial selection, it was difficult to understand what was happening without the benefit of hindsight, and some elections
(most notably 1982) obscured the pattern of what was occurring in Texas judicial politics. Then, when the changes did
occur, and Texas moved to being largely a one-party
Republican state, the changes occurred rapidly. Now Texans
should know what can happen in state judicial politics. The
dramatic changes in Texas in the 1980s and early 1990s began
with major Republican victories in judicial elections in Dallas
County and spread from there. There is a historical pattern for
what is happening now that did not exist in the earlier era. If
those changes remain clear—so there are no confusing signals
about what is happening such as occurred in the 1982 election—and if those changes are slow enough for key interest
groups to be unable to identify a political advantage in remaining with the existing system of selection, the changes Hill first
spoke about in 1986 may well occur.

The Texas system offers valuable lessons for other states
considering changing their system of judicial selection. This is
not simply a case study of the failure and prospects for judicial
reform in one state. The Texas case tells us that change in a
system of selection really is not for the “short-winded.” It can
be a difficult and time-consuming process of putting together
a coalition of key interest groups that begin to see political
advantages in alternatives to the present system of judicial
selection and that see disadvantages in remaining with that
system. The Texas reform movement shows the need for a
lengthy and persistent political battle to build that political
coalition. Most importantly, the Texas efforts at judicial reform
show the importance of changes in the state political environment in creating changes in the state’s judicial politics.
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